S. Hrg. 109-311: Abel Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing

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The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty.

Attended by a who’s-who of top al Qaeda operational killers, that meeting set the stage for not only the Cole bombing and the 9/11 attacks, but also the October 2002 Bali bombings, to which Hambali was later linked. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry later concludes that had the asset’s contacts with the hijackers been capitalized upon, it “would have given the San Diego FBI field office perhaps the U.

Sitting next to them in a three-seat configuration was Khallad bin Atash, the one-legged Saudi who had sent al-‘Owali to his intended death in Nairobi. Do you understand that pursuant to the relevant statutes, conviction on those five counts would subject you to a total maximum sentence of incarceration of life imprisonment plus any term of years. We now know, from the testimony during the March 2006 penalty phase at the trial of accused “twentieth hijacker” Zacarias Moussaoui, that the one-legged Khallad was also an operational leader of the embassy bombing plot. We got the number from a confession from Al-’Owhali ,” says former FBI agent and Squad I-49 operative Jack Cloonan. As the Feds partied on, bin Laden’s jihadis were working day and night from Afghanistan to San Diego to Brooklyn to bring those Towers down.

It was the phone line in that Yemeni safe house that led the CIA to the discovery of the single most important al Qaeda planning session prior to the 9/11 attacks. Congressman Weldon also claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to close the books on the subject rather than report on the facts. The witnesses reported to the journalists that the IG investigators got increasingly hostile in an effort to intimidate the witnesses into changing their testimony to drop any assertion that they had identified and tracked Atta, and this suggests a cover-up by the IG of Able Danger's findings. In December 2006, a sixteen-month investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded "Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001", and dismissed other assertions that have fueled 9/11 conspiracy theories. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified 2 of 3 Al Qaeda cells active in the 9/11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to Blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, including September 11 attacks leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of an al Qaeda cell linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.The FBI later concludes that Shaykh is not involved in the 9/11 plot, but they have serious doubts about his credibility. He may have even trained al Qaeda cell members in Somalia who helped take down those two Blackhawks in 1993. The Ali Mohamed link chart opens a whole new series of questions that have to be answered,” said former Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) one of the original backers of the LIWA unit at Fort Belvoir, and the man who first disclosed the story of the Able Danger operation to The New York Times in August, 2005. Clearly they had criminal jurisdiction to pursue the leads as a result of Khallad’s ties to the Embassy bombing.

Anthony Shaffer, “but they also identified Aden Yemen at one of the top three al Qaeda hotspots in the world.L. summit, al-Midhar’s passport was copied in Dubai and sent to the CIA’s Alec Station (where the FBI had an agent in residence). As Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball reported in Newsweek, KSM’s presence at the meeting “would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. In any case, one lesson that the FBI should have learned from the Malaysian summit was just how well coordinated al Qaeda was.